Tulsa Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 2 2001-2002 Supreme Court Review
Winter 2002

The War on the Poor - News from the Front: Department of
Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker
Tamara R. Piety

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tamara R. Piety, The War on the Poor - News from the Front: Department of Housing and Urban
Development v. Rucker, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 385 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss2/7

This Supreme Court Review Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Piety: The War on the Poor - News from the Front: Department of Housing

THE WAR ON THE POOR-NEWS FROM THE
FRONT: DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT V. RUCKER@

Tamara R. Piety*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Blame it on Johnson. He may have launched the "War on Poverty" but it
appears that the only sentiment surviving from that era is that "war" makes for a
terrific metaphor for political projects. The substantive goals of the Johnson era
War on Poverty-the belief that hard-core poverty and America cannot co-exist
without the former diminishing the latter and that, therefore, the eradication of
such poverty is a worthy and attainable goal'-these ideas appear to have

vanished from the American political landscape. Instead, we are presented with
cuts in social services, public housing, Medicare, and various other safety nets for
the poor. In addition, the cost of housing relative to real wages at the bottom of

the economic ladder has made it extremely difficult for the working poor to afford
any housing at all.2 But as much or more as this about-face in political philosophy,
it has been a second metaphorical war that has presented one of the most
sustained attacks on the poor. I am, of course, referring to the "War on Drugs," a

war that was started when Johnson's other "war" was won and which soon
outstripped it in terms of its political opportunities.

For the last three decades of the twentieth century, the War on Drugs has
presented politicians with an apparently cost-free source of political capital.
There seems to have been universal agreement that drugs are "bad" and that all

© 2002 Tamara R. Piety.
* Assistant Professor, The University of Tulsa College of Law. Thanks to Jeanne Merino at
Stanford who alerted me to this issue, to Robert Chapman who provided me with several useful leads,
Laura Frossard of Legal Services of Oklahoma for context and data, and to my colleagues, Gary
Allison, Janet Levit, and Madeline Plascencia who read drafts of this article or otherwise helped me to
bring this project to fruition. Thanks also to the faculty at Widener University School of Law where I
first presented this paper and who helped me to sharpen it, as well as to Brian Foley and Barry Furrow
for the invitation, and to my research assistant Michael Esmond, without whom this could not have
been written. Finally, my love and thanks to TBD for all his inspiration, support, and affirmations.
1. See e.g. Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States 164 (MacMillan
1962).
2. See e.g. Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting by in America 169-70
(Metropolitan Books 2001).
3. However, just like Vietnam, the War on Drugs may be unwinnable.
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right-thinking persons are against them4 (whatever that means in a society in
which tobacco and alcohol are legal). Perhaps because intensifying the war
against drugs was one of the few things that both Democrats and Republicans
could agree on, it represented a handy bargaining chip for drumming up bipartisan
support on more controversial subjects. And of course no one wanted to offer an
opponent the opportunity to use the label "soft on crime" against him or her by
expressing a concern for civil liberties that the drug war was eroding. As a result,
during those years, Congress passed ever more draconian laws in the attempt to
regulate drugs.' And, rather than acting as a brake on a runaway Congress, the
courts have, for the most part, abdicated their responsibility to function in this role
by rubberstamping whatever interpretation eager prosecutors have cared to offer,
even when these prosecutors were clearly not disinterested parties.6
Not surprisingly, the brunt of these laws has fallen on the poor. It is, for the
most part, the poor not the middle class7 who fill the nation's jails and prisons on
drug charges (although there is no shortage of drug use in the middle and upper
classes).8 Well-heeled addicts have the opportunity to go to treatment. They can
afford good lawyers. They can pay for their own or their children's college tuition.
They do not depend on food stamps or public assistance in order to survive 9 and
are thus unaffected by withdrawals of such assistance. No withdrawal of public
housing assistance may be added to the list. This past Term, the Court upheld one
more deprivation that will apply only to the poor in Department of Housing and
Urban Development v. Rucker:1 ° There the Court held that a public housing

authority ("PHA") may evict an entire family from public housing because one
member has been accused of involvement in illegal drug activity.
Ironically, at the time this case was decided, the respondents in the Rucker
case were not the only families experiencing the heartbreak of a family member

4. See e.g. Craig Horowitz, Drugs Are Bad: The Drug War Is Worse, N.Y. Mag. 22-33 (Feb. 5,
1996).
5. Of course, to the extent that innocence may not always matter or be able to be proven,
sometimes the penalties fall on those with no connection to drugs. See e.g. Lynn M. Paltrow, The War
on Drugs and the War on Abortion: Some Initial Thoughts on the Connections, Intersectionsand Effects,
28 S.U. L. Rev. 201, 237-38 (2001) (noting innocent victims of drug war laws in several contexts); Carol
M. Bast, The Plight of the Minority Motorist, 39 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 49 (1994) (noting burden on
innocent minority motorists); Tamara R. Piety, Student Author, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of
the Doctrine of Civil Forfeiture Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 911 (1991)
(forfeiture can result in loss of property to innocent people); see Too Many Convicts, The Economist 9
(Aug. 10, 2002) (increase in jail population partly a result of increase in mandatory minimum sentences
for drug crimes).
6. Piety, supra n. 5. See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilson, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's
Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35 (1998).
7. Horowitz, supra n. 4.
8. Id.
9. Cf Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that state law authorizing
suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients, and conditioning benefits on agreement to same, not
violative of Fourth Amendment).
10. 122 S. Ct. 1230 (2002).
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with a drug problem. 1 Only a couple of months before the opinion was released,
Noelle Bush, the President's niece and daughter of Florida Governor Jeb Bush,
was arrested for forging a prescription for Xanax, a powerful anti-anxiety agent,
and attempting to obtain Xanax with that forged prescription. 12 Forging a
prescription is a felony. 3 However, Ms. Bush was offered the opportunity to go to
treatment, which, if she managed to successfully complete it, would mean that she
could avoid jail and a criminal record. 14 Unfortunately, Ms. Bush has been found
in violation of the conditions of this reprieve several times.'5 Somehow, though, it
seems unlikely that it will be "three Strikes and you're out" for Ms. Bush. But
whatever happens to Ms. Bush, Jeb Bush will not lose his house over it or be
turned out of the governor's mansion (which is a species of "public" housing) 6
But that is exactly what the United States Supreme Court has said the Oakland
Housing Authority ("OHA") may do to Pearlie Rucker. The Court held that
Rucker can be turned out of her home because her mentally-disabled daughter
who, arrested for public intoxication, was found to have drug paraphernalia in her
possession. 7 For Rucker, Willie Lee, Barbara Hill, and Herman Walker, the
"One Strike and You're Out" policy, inaugurated under the Clinton
administration, 8 was invoked by the OHA, and the respondents' claim that they
lacked knowledge of the drug-related activity was deemed no defense by the
OHA."
This result adds to the list of outrages and losses that have been imposed on
the poor, turning the so-called War on Drugs into a war on the poor. These losses
operate to systematically close door after door on the various means by which one

11. Actually, for two of the respondents, Barbara Hill and Willie Lee, it is not clear their grandsons
had a "drug problem." These grandmothers were evicted because their grandsons allegedly smoked
marijuana in the parking lot. They well may not be addicts.
12. Mark Potter, Jeb Bush's Daughter Chargedwith Prescription Fraud <http://www/cnn.com/2002/
US/01/29/jeb.bush.daughter.drugs.index.html> (accessed Jan. 29, 2002).
13. See e.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.0022 (West 2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 893.13 (7)(a)(8)-(10) (West
2000).
14. Michelle Goldberg, Noelle Bush Gets Rehab, the Poor and Black Get Hard Time <http://www.
salon.com/news/feature/2002/08/05/drug-reform> (accessed Aug. 5, 2002).
15. Judge Says Noelle Bush "On Track," L.A. Times A27 (Nov. 9, 2002).
16. I suppose it is possible that, had Jeb Bush lost the election, it could be said to have contributed
to him losing his "public housing" to the extent that any one incident can "cause" an election result.
However, he did not lose. And this issue did not even seem to be much of a liability for him, although
he did catch some criticism on the issue of disparate treatment. See e.g. Peter Wallsten, Noelle Bush
Case Sparks Legal Controversy <http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/4130225.htm> (accessed
Sept. 23, 2002); Goldberg, supra n. 14; Robert Hornstein, Treena Kaye & Daniel Atkins, Rules Differ
When Bushes and PoorEncounter Drug Problems, 113 Fulton County Daily Rptr. 7 (Mar. 21, 2002).
17. See Rucker, 122 S. Ct. at 1232. It should be noted, however, that the OHA has dropped its
unlawful detainer action against Rucker (but not the other respondents), because Rucker's daughter is
now incarcerated. Id. at 1232 n. 1.
18. See e.g. John F. Harris, Clinton Links Housing Aid to Eviction of Crime Suspects: Civil
LibertariansAttack "One-Strike" Policy That Affects Defendants Not Yet Convicted, Washington Post
A14 (Mar. 29, 1996). Although, as the title indicates, the article focuses on the objection that
defendants who are not convicted of anything may be evicted; as it turns out, a defendant's family
members who are not even accused of anything may also be evicted. As one observer put it, this is not
a "one-strike" policy, it is a "no-strike" policy. Id. (quoting Mark Kappelhoff, legislative counsel to the
American Civil Liberties Union's Washington national office).
19. Rucker, 122 S.Ct. at 1236.
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might be able to escape from the vicious cycle of poverty. The last decade saw
increases in penalties for drug convictions, ° as well as the denial of welfare
benefits,

21

student loans, 22 and Pell grants to those convicted of a drug offense, and

sometimes to those not even accused of a drug offense.23 This period also saw
disparate drug enforcement in minority communities, 24 including the disparate

impact stemming from wide variation in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
crack versus powder cocaine.2 ' All this as a result of the War on Drugs.
It continues to be true that this is a nation in which we have a two-tiered
response to the problem of drug addiction.21 For the affluent, especially
celebrities, it is treatment and a request for privacy. 21 Under this approach, drug
and alcohol addiction is a regrettable occurrence, but one that can happen in the
best of families. In these cases, the appropriate thing to do is (apparently) respect
the family's "privacy, 2 8 and to forgive "youthful errors., 29 Thus, Governor Bush

asks the media to respect his family's privacy, President Bush refused to answer
questions about his own alleged drug use,30 and the coverage of his daughters'
brushes with the law for underage drinking and DUI inspired some to cry foul
over the media's intrusion into the personal lives of the families of public figures.

20. See e.g. Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1389, 1398-99 (1993) (describing some penalties handed out in drug cases, stemming
from possession of crack, as harsher than murder conviction during same time period because of the
high mandatory minimum sentences for drug convictions).
21. See generally Corinne A. Carey, Student Author, Crafting a Challenge to the Practice of Drug
Testing Welfare Recipients: FederalWelfare Reform and State Response as the Most Recent Chapter in
the War on Drugs, 46 Buff. L. Rev. 281 (1998).
22. Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilson, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War on Drugs
Became a War on Education, 6 J. Gender Race & Just. 61, 68-72 (2002) (describing how drug related
expulsions, denial of student loan eligibility, and Pell grants are remedies falling hardest on the poor
and those most in need of a means to survive outside of the illegal drug trade). This excellent article is
the second exposd of the costs of the War on Drugs undertaken by Professors Blumenson and Nilson.
Their first, Policingfor Profit, exposed the distortion in law enforcement objectives and enforcement
activities, not to mention outright corruption, that arises out of the forfeiture laws and the provision
that much of the money seized may be returned to the seizing agency. See Blumenson & Nilson, supra
n. 6.
23. Blumenson & Nilson, supra n. 22, at 75.
24. "Joseph McNamara, former San Jose police chief, put it succinctly: 'The drug war has become a
race war."' Paltrow, supra n. 5 (describing drug testing of pregnant women disproportionately
conducted on African-American women) (quoting Horowitz, supra n. 4); Bast, supra n. 5 (describing
how stops to look for drugs disproportionately target minority motorists).
25. D.J. Silton, U.S. Prisonsand Racial Profiling. A Covertly Racist Nation Rides a Vicious Cycle, 20
L. & Inequality 53, 60 (2002).
26. Indeed a recent symposium asked whether the War on Drugs is a new form of Jim Crow law.
Symposium, U.S. Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow?, 10 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rights L. Rev. 303-474 (2001)
(multiple articles).
27. Potter, supra n. 12.
28. See e.g. Mark Hollis & Bob Mahlburg, Public Families, Private Issues; Noelle Bush Arrest
Spotlights Obvious Scrutiny Placed on Political Life, S. Fla. Sun-Sentinel 10B (Feb. 2, 2002) (available
in 2002 WL 2944528).
29. Id.
30. See e.g. Ethan A. Nadelmann, A Sound Basis for a Drug Policy <http://www.november.org/
razorwire/2002-Olspring/pageO7.html> (accessed Sept. 26, 2002).
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It is a truism that having a politician in the family can wreak havoc on the
31
whole family's mental health. Witness the drug and alcohol addictions of Betty
Ford,32 Kitty Dukakis,33 the death of George McGovern's daughter, Terry,34 and
the well-publicized travails of the Kennedy family.35 Like politics or being in the
public eye, however, poverty is also a known risk factor for substance abuse
problems. 36 But the drug problems of the poor are not considered a "private"
family matter, or an illness requiring treatment and applause to the addict for the
courage to seek treatment. Instead, drug addiction among the poor is treated as a
public problem resulting from moral failure and lack of adequate supervision.
Instead of treatment, the poor, by and large, are "treated" to jail and prison.37
And the addict is not the only sufferer. The whole family suffers when one
member is an addict. Still, whatever losses and hardships are imposed on a family
by virtue of the addict's disease (and they are often devastating), they are
rendered even more onerous by holding the whole family responsible for the
activities of one of its members and depriving it of housing.

II.

THE FACTS

The cases and briefs do not recite much in the way of facts, but this much is
known. All of the named respondents, Pearlie Rucker, Willie Lee, Barbara Hill,
and Herman Walker are over sixty years old.38 With the exception of Walker,
each had been living in public housing for more than ten years.3 9 Barbara Hill
lived in public housing for approximately thirty years. 40 Three of the four named
respondents are grandmothers with grandchildren living with them.41 Pearlie
Rucker's household includes a great-grandchild.42
The incidents giving rise to the eviction notices in three of the four cases
involved alleged drug use and/or drug possession outside of the apartment itself.
In Rucker's case, her daughter Gelinda, also a resident of her apartment, is
mentally disabled and an alcoholic. 43 In light of Gelinda's prior treatment for
alcohol abuse, Rucker asserted it was her practice to search her daughter's room
periodically for evidence of drugs or alcohol. 44 Rucker claimed that she had no

31. Hollis & Mahlburg, supra n. 28; Nadelmann, supra n. 30.
32. Nadelman, supra n. 30; Betty Ford & Chris Chase, Betty: A Glad Awakening (MacMilllan 1988).
33. Nadelman, supra n. 30.
34. George McGovern, Terry: My Daughter's Life-and-Death Struggle with Alcoholism (Villard
Books 1996).
35. Hollis & Mahlburg, supra n. 28.
36. John J. Ammann, Housing Out the Poor,19 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 309, 316 (2000).
37. Goldberg, supra n. 14.
38. Br. of Respt. Jt. App. at 30a, 33a, 36a, 41a, Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230 (affidavits of respondents
Barbara Hill, Willie Lee, Herman Walker, and Pearlie Rucker).
39. Id. at 30a, 33a, 41a.
40. Id. at 30a.
41. Br. of Respt. at 1, Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230.
42. Id. at 27.
43. Id. at 43a (affidavit of Pearlie Rucker).
44. Br. of Respt. Jt. App. at 43a, Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230.
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indication from these searches that her daughter was using drugs or alcohol.45
Nevertheless, Gelinda was spotted drinking with an open container three blocks
from the complex. 46 A search of her person revealed cocaine and a crack pipe; she
was arrested and charged with possession. 47 Barbara Hill and Willie Lee's
grandsons were caught smoking marijuana in the parking lot of the apartment48
complex after police responded to a report of "narcotics" use in the parking lot.
Lee's grandson was charged with possession, 49 and the Unlawful Detainer
Complaint alleged that both admitted to smoking marijuana. 50 All three
respondents say that they took care to warn members of their household that drug
use could result in eviction. 5i
In contrast to the three grandmothers, the allegations relating to Herman
Walker involved drug use or possession on the premises, although by whom is not
entirely clear. Walker is disabled.52 He is partially paralyzed on the left side,
walks with difficulty, and needs a cane and the periodic use of bottled oxygen."
He cannot live on his own and requires the services of a home healthcare
worker.54 That home healthcare worker was a woman named Eleanor Randle.55
On three separate occasions, OHA Police found persons other than either Walker
or his caregiver, Randle, in the apartment and found drugs or drug paraphernalia
either in these persons' possession or in the apartment." According to the
Unlawful Detainer Complaint, twice a non-resident was seen in the apartment in a
nightgown.57 The report states that women's clothing was found scattered
throughout the apartment, and it appeared that these other women were living in
the apartment, despite Walker's protests that they were not. 5 8 Also, on one
occasion, crack and four crack pipes were found in a box in Walker's bedroom.59
Reviewing the above facts, it is tempting to conclude that Walker's case is
factually distinguishable from that of the three grandmothers, and in many ways it
is. But all four respondents faced a similar dilemma. Where would they go if they
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Br. of Respt. at 1, Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230.
Id. at 13a. at 42a.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 18a.
Id. at 31a, 34a.
Br. of Respt. at 31a, 34a, 39a, 44a, Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230.

52. Id. at 36a.
53. Id.

54. Id. at 37a.
55. Id. at 39a.
56. Br. of Respt. at 37a-39a, Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230.
57. Id. at 37a.
58. Id. at 38a.
59. Id. at 39a. These facts are certainly suggestive of the possibility that Walker's apartment was
being used as a crackhouse, with or without his consent (although it is difficult to imagine how it could
be without his knowledge). After the third visit from the housing police and third notice of a violation,
Walker fired Randle. One might ask what took him so long, but one has to consider the circumstances.
If Walker was dependant upon Randle to assist him in his basic daily needs, he may have felt unable to
confront her or afraid to do so. Alternatively, he may have been participating in the drug use that was
apparently going on in his apartment. In which case, it would not be too surprising that he failed to fire
Randle on the first notice.
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were evicted? And, if the OHA succeeded in evicting the respondents, it would
perforce also be evicting any children who lived with some of them. Where would
6
these children go? This was apparently of little interest to the OHA. 0
III.

THE LEGAL CLAIM

OHA's leases include language, mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6), that,
according to the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"),
allow the public housing authorities the discretion to evict a tenant when a
member of the household or a guest is accused of drug-related activity, regardless
of whether the tenant knew or had any involvement in the alleged activity. The
authorizing language existed as early as 1991,61 but it was apparently not until
1996, after then-President Clinton announced it in his State of the Union address,
that HUD took the position that this language could be interpreted to permit the

eviction of innocent tenants. 62
To challenge this interpretation, the tenants had to negotiate a dizzying
series of doctrinal moves through administrative law in order to state their claim.
The tenants sued HUD, OHA, and the director of the OHA, claiming that the
lease and agency policy which purported to authorize their eviction was in conflict
with the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") because the lease, and the policy
under which the OHA acted, were in conflict with the congressional intent
reflected in the authorizing statute and, thus, the APA.63
Pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc.,64 in analyzing such a claim a court must first determine if the statutory
language in question is unambiguous. If it is, and if the agency's regulation or
policy is consistent with the unambiguous language, then the court will uphold the

agency interpretation. 61 If, on the other hand, the agency's interpretation is
66
inconsistent with that language, the agency's interpretation will be struck down.
Things get more interesting if a court concludes that it is unable to determine

Congress' intent from the language of the relevant statute. At that point, under
Chevron, a court is to analyze whether an agency's interpretation of the statute is
60. Laura Frossard, an Attorney for Legal Services of Oklahoma, reports encountering a similar
indifference on the part of the representatives of the Tulsa Housing Authority. She says that this
attitude has been dubbed the "Just Go Die" policy by her colleagues at Legal Services.
61. See President William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996) (available in 1996
WL 23253 at *8). Actually, what Clinton said was, "From now on, the rule for residents who commit
crime and pedal drugs should be one strike and you're out." Because this suggests that eviction (a)
turns on a conviction (to the extent it assumes the facts asserted) and (b) only applies to the
wrongdoers, arguably this is not at all the same policy that HUD asserts it is permitted under the
statute in this case. However, this easy elision between talk of fault to those with no fault is common in
this area. And some commentators have taken President Clinton's remarks in this address to refer to
the launching of this policy by HUD. See e.g. Robyn Minter Smyers, High Noon in Public Housing:
The Showdown between Due Process Rights and Good Management Practicesin the War on Drugs and
Crime, 30 Urban Law. 573,612 (1998).
62. See Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51560, 51567 (1991).
63. See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 WL 345403 at **4-5 (N.D. Cal. June 19,1998).
64. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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"unreasonable."67
Because getting to this step involves concluding, that
congressional intent is ambiguous, the reasonableness inquiry is apparently a
global one, that is, not whether it is reasonable given congressional intent, but
whether it is reasonable period. An inquiry such as this, untethered to any
particular criteria, seems to run the risk that the reasonableness standard
represents no standard at all and that literally anything might go.
Beginning in 1997, the OHA began a proceeding in state court to evict Willie
Lee, Barbara Hill, Pearlie Rucker, and Herman Walker.68 After the state court
proceedings were filed, the tenants filed an action in federal district court against
not only OHA, but also HUD, alleging that HUD's interpretation of the statute
did not require lease terms that would or could result in the eviction of tenants
innocent of any wrongdoing. 69 Moreover, they argued that even if the HUD
interpretation was consistent with the APA, this interpretation of 42 U.S.C. §
1437d(l)(6) violates due process where the statute's operation, through the HUD
lease terms, could result in the eviction of a tenant innocent of any wrongdoing.7 °
The tenants asked for an injunction restraining OHA from terminating their
leases where the tenant "had no knowledge and no reason to know
of the drug72
related criminal activity."'" The district court granted this request.
On appeal of that decision, a Ninth Circuit panel held that OHA's
interpretation of the statute was correct.73 The panel found the language of
Section 1437d(/)(6) unambiguous and that it permitted eviction of tenants who
may be in violation of this lease provision, whether or not they were personally
aware of any drug-related activity.74 However, rehearing en banc was granted and
the en banc court reversed, holding that HUD's interpretation was inconsistent
with congressional intent and therefore "must be rejected" under Chevron.75
IV. "HEADS I WIN, TAILS You LOSE": THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Chevron test requires a reviewing court to first determine whether or

not Congress has spoken directly to the matter in question. 76 If Congress has
spoken to the matter, its intent must be given effect. But the question is, how do
you determine what the intent of Congress was? Supreme Court precedent has
suggested two possibilities. In the first approach, labeled "textualism" by some
observers and identified with Justice Scalia, a reviewing court is to confine itself to
analyzing the statutory language, without resort to legislative history.77 On the
67. Id.
68. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. at 1232.
69. Id. at 1231.
70. Id.
71. Rucker v. Davis, 1998 WL 345403 at *7.
72. Id. at **13-14.
73. Rucker v. Davis, 203 F.3d. 627, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2000).
74. Id.
75. Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1126 (2001) (en banc) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
76. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
77. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T.
Mayton, Administrative Law 487-490 (West Group 2001).
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other hand, in Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
18
Corp., the Court found it necessary and appropriate to resort to legislative
history in order to interpret the congressional intent behind specific statutory
language. The various opinions in Rucker, from the district court to the panel
opinion of the Ninth Circuit to the en banc opinion, reflect this disagreement over
the proper interpretative approach.
The Ninth Circuit, citing the Supreme Court in its recent decision striking
down the attempts of the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to regulate
tobacco, asserted that it was not enough to look at "'a particular statutory
provision in isolation.' ' 79 "Rather, 'the words of [the] statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme."' 80
Concluding that this context suggested that Congress did not mean to subject
innocent tenants to eviction, the Ninth Circuit found that HUD's contrary
interpretation was not entitled to any deference under Chevron.8'
The Supreme Court came to precisely the opposite conclusion. However,
instead of resorting to legislative history or context, the Supreme Court concluded
such resort was unnecessary where "the plain language" was "unambiguous., 82 As
is traditionally the case, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to explain how it
was that some language could be simultaneously "unambiguous" and
unambiguously found to be ambiguous by a majority of the Ninth Circuit sitting
en banc. These are things that, apparently, esteemed jurists just do not discuss.
But it is worth examining this language that was apparently so needlessly
troublesome to the Ninth Circuit. The statute provides:
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which.., provide that any criminal
activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the
premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's
household, or any guest or83other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause
for termination of tenancy.
This sentence is not a model of clarity. But then so few statutes are. Their
drafters are usually lawyers, not grammarians. Nevertheless, in the time-honored
legal practice of knowing one thing and acting as if it is something else altogether,
we act as if Congress could be said to have an intent and did put together this
sentence in full awareness of the rules of grammar. Adopting this fiction, the
Court concluded that reading this sentence as the en banc Ninth Circuit did-that
is, that the words "or other person under the tenant's control" suggested that the
operative concern for each of the categories was control and hence knowledge on

78. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
79. Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. at 1233.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (Supp. 2002). This language was adopted virtually verbatim by OHA in
its leases. Thus, the interpretive issue is whether HUD and OHA's interpretationof this language, that
it permits evictions of innocent tenants, is consistent with congressional intent.
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the part of the tenant-ran "counter to basic rules of grammar." 84 Since the Court
does not indicate which particular rule of grammar it is relying on, we just have to
take its word for it that the Court's grasp of the basic rules of grammar is better
than that of the Ninth Circuit. But perhaps not. We can look at this more closely.
A.

The Meaning of "Or"

The Court says the "disjunctive 'or' means that the qualification [under the
tenant's control] applies only to 'other person.' ' 8 5 But this reads any significance
out of the word "other." However, there is another interpretation that makes
sense of "other." My dictionary offers several definitions of "or," among which
are the following:
(a) "an alternative; (b) the second of two alternatives (either right or wrong); (c) the
(d) a "synonymous or equivalent expression (acrophobia or
first of two alternatives;
86

fear of heights)."

"Synonymous or equivalent expression." It seems manifest that Congress

was using the word "or" as a "synonymous or equivalent expression," rather than
in its disjunctive meaning. Why is this so obvious? Well, it is hard to understand
why else the word "other" appears in this sentence. Had Congress meant simply
to create a fourth category of persons who could place the tenant's lease in
jeopardy (after the tenant, a member of tenant's household, or a guest), it could
have drafted the sentence to read "or a person under the tenant's control" instead
of "other person under the tenant's control ......
The only reason this fourth class of persons exists is that otherwise it seems
anomalous-rather like those elementary I.Q. tests that ask children to identify
the thing that does not fit: violin, viola, tuba, or cello. Of course, you are meant to
identify the tuba as not being a string instrument. Similarly, "a person under the
tenant's control" does not "fit" with the rest of the category unless we assume that
the remaining persons in the list are "persons under the tenant's control."
While it is no doubt a legal fiction that any person in this list (including the
tenant herself if she is an addict) is "under the tenant's control," it seems
reasonable, at least as a rebuttable presumption, to assume that a tenant can
control herself, the members of her household, and her guests."' If we view the list
in this way, it seems obvious that this assumption is the only one that makes sense
of the word "other." To the extent that we can attribute any particular intelligible

84. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. at 1234.
85. Id.
86. The American HeritageDictionary of the English Language 1236 (4th ed., Houghton Mifflin Co.

2000).
87. This is clearly a legal fiction as any parent of a teenage surely knows. There is no one over
whom less control can be asserted than a teenager. Furthermore, inviting someone to your home does
not mean that you intend to act as a surety for his or her behavior-although the law sometimes
requires you to do so. Moreover, mental disability, and certainly addiction, may impair one's ability to
control one's own behavior. All these situations can be viewed as deviations from a norm in which
parents are expected to control children, and hosts guests, and every other person is expected to
control himself or herself.
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"intent" to Congress, it seems as if in drafting this provision Congress meant to
identify, in addition to the tenant herself, all of the people over whom the tenant
could be said to exert any authority or influence, even if only that of putting the
offender out.88 As the Court observed in Brown & Williamson, context is
important. 89 And, according to the en banc Court of Appeals, it was this recitation
of context that the Ninth Circuit en banc majority felt required reading into the
statute a congressional intent to exempt tenants who could prove that they were
either ignorant of the illegal behavior despite their vigilance, or that vigilance and
warnings had been ineffective. 9°
However, the Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit's resort to
congressional intent was error given that its own reading of the statutory language
led it to conclude the language was clear and unambiguous. 9 Ironically though,
the Ninth Circuit had drawn its conclusion, about the importance of context, from
the Supreme Court. It was in Brown & Williamson (upon which the Ninth Circuit
relied), that the Supreme Court resorted to "context" to conclude that "drug" was
a term that did not include nicotine, despite scientific evidence that nicotine was
indeed a drug, because there context revealed to the Court that Congress had not
intended to give the FDA regulatory authority over tobacco. 92
B.

By "Any" Means

The second challenge to a reader's language skills occurred with the word
"any" in the above statute. The Court interpreted the word "any" to plainly and
unambiguously allow for the eviction of innocent tenants if a person within one of
the statutory categories engaged in "[any drug-related criminal activity. 9 3 For
the Court the operative word here was "any." As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated,
"any" means even that activity of which the tenant is unaware because "the word
'any' has an expansive meaning-i.e., 'one or some indiscriminately of whatever
kind."' 94
But "any" is further modified by "criminal." The phrase in the statute is
"any criminal activity." 95 And while strict liability in criminal law is certainly not
unknown, and indeed has arguably expanded in effect, if not in name, with the
expansion of the civil forfeiture laws, criminal liability is generally understood to
require mens rea.96 That is so integral a part of what is conceived to be the nature

88. Query how reasonable or feasible this is with respect to minor teenagers and to Herman
Walker's home health care worker on whom he apparently relied for assistance in performing the most
basic functions of everyday life.
89. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 131.

90. Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1119.
91. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. at 1234.
92. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 131.
93. See Respt. Br. Jt. App. at 59a, Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230 (emphasis added).
94. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. at 1233 (quoting U.S. v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (emphasis added).
96. But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"? Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193 (1991) (discussing explosion of so-called
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of criminal responsibility that it may be that the Ninth Circuit thought it went
without saying. Had Congress wanted to make clear that it intended no fault
liability for the actions of others, it could not only have said so, as the Ninth
Circuit pointed out, but alternate phrasing, to eliminate the word "criminal,"
could have been used. For instance, the statute could have read, "activity
involving illegal drugs."97 The use of the word "criminal" makes the Ninth
Circuit's assumption that Congress did not intend to allow innocent tenants to be
evicted, at the very least, plausible.98 It was certainly entitled to more discussion
than the Supreme Court afforded it.
C.

"Justin Case"--Legislative History

Despite what the "plain language" revealed to the Supreme Court (if not to
the Ninth Circuit), it went on to compare the housing provision with the
amendments made to the forfeiture provision in 21 U.S.C. § 881. Section 881 was
amended in 1988 as part of the same legislative enactment to add "leasehold
interests" to the interests that could be forfeited under the forfeiture laws. This
provision has an innocent owner exception.99 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
since the two subsections were part of the same enactment, they should be read in
°
pari materia.'0
Once again, the Circuit Court apparently missed the obvious
because, according to the Supreme Court, "the two sections deal with distinctly
different matters." 10 1
The "innocent owner" defense for drug forfeiture case was already in existence prior
to 1988 as a part of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). All Congress did in the 1988 Act was to
add "leasehold interests" to the property interests that might be forfeited under the
drug statute. And if such a forfeiture action were brought against a leasehold
interest, it would be subject to the pre-existing "innocent owner" defense. But 42
U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6), with which we deal here, is quite a different measure. It is
entirely reasonable to think that the Government, when seeking to transfer private
property to itself in a [civil] forfeiture proceeding, should be subject to an "innocent
owner defense," while it should not be when acting as a landlord in a public housing
project. The forfeiture provision shows that Congress knew exactly how to provide
an "innocent owner" defense. It did not provide one in § 1437d()(6) .... 102

Well, to the uninitiated, that may sound entirely reasonable. However, there
are a couple of problems. First, prior decisions of the Court have concluded that

"strict liability" crimes). Of course, whose mens rea is another question. Perhaps it only implies mens

rea on the part of the offender, not the tenant, since "criminal" modifies "activity."
97. Of course without the word "illegal," the statute would have again been rendered intolerably
vague and in need of resort to "context" since the word "drug" could include prescription drugs,
narcotic and non-narcotic, as well as nicotine and perhaps caffeine as well.
98. Furthermore, one could argue that "criminal" requires a conviction prior to eviction.
99. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994). The innocent owner provision formerly in Section 881 was
amended pursuant to the Comprehensive Asset Forfeiture Reform Act in 2000. See Civil Asset Reform
Act of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185,114 Stat. 202 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 983-986 (2000)).
100. Rucker, 277 F.3d at 1121.
101. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. at 1234.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
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public housing tenants do enjoy a "property interest" in their tenancies, at least to
the extent that they may not be deprived of them without some due process
protections.0 3 It was precisely these due process protections that Congress wished
to avoid by placing "leasehold interests" in Section 881.'04 As the dissenters from
the en banc Ninth Circuit opinion observed, "Congress recognized that the
forfeiture statute permitted the government to seize property without providing
any procedural protections to the owner of the property"105 by cutting "'through
the usual drawn-out process of first notifying the drug dealers that they would be
evicted and then battling them in court[ ] .... ,,,106 In 1988, it was true that
property owners could have their property seized without notice. However, by
1993 that was no longer true. In United States v. James Daniel Good Real
°7
Property,1
the Court held that seizure of real property requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard.10 8 Thus, by March, 2002, this was certainly not true
anymore and it is difficult to conclude that the two sections should be read
differently.
Given that the significance of the deprivation involved when removing
public housing tenants from their homes was the rationale for recognizing that
public housing tenants have a property interest of a sort in housing, 109 it seems
perverse to distinguish leaseholds from other property forfeited to the government
on the ground that the government "already" owns it. 10 The passage quoted by
the dissent in the Ninth Circuit opinion makes it clear that the kinds of
"leaseholds" Congress had in mind when it amended Section 881 was primarily, if
not exclusively, the public housing leaseholds. And when you think about it, what
other leaseholds would be of any use to the government? What use could the
government get from taking over a leasehold where it was not already the owner
of the property in some fashion?
As the above-quoted language makes clear, by adding leaseholds to Section
881, Congress sought to bypass the procedural protections afforded to public
housing tenants, procedural protections that were extended in recognition of the
tenants' property interests in their leaseholds and substitute the (at that time)
virtually process-free procedures offered to prosecutors in civil forfeiture

103. See e.g. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
104. Gregory W. Wiercioch, Student Author, Eviction without Conviction: Public Housing Leasehold
Forfeitureunder21 U.S.C. Section 881, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1409,1418-19 (1991).
105. Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1132 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (quoting 134 Cong. Rec. E1965-02 (1988)).
107. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
108. Id. at 59.
109. See e.g. Escalera v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir. 1970) (even though public
housing tenancy characterized as a "privilege," this is not necessarily dispositive for purposes of
Fourteenth Amendment).
110. Note this argument may be seen as a variation on the relation-back doctrine. This is the legal
fiction whereby the law declares you have not lost anything by forfeiture because it belongs to the
government anyway, by virtue of the illegal act that justifies the forfeiture. Heads I win, tails you lose.
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actions."1 I Once there was effectively little difference between the two methods of
proceeding (or at least those differences have been minimized in this crucial respect), it
is hard to see how this history provides a basis for concluding that HUD's policy is
distinguishable. It is ironic that this has now become the justification for bypassing
the substantive protection that, according to the dissent in the Ninth Circuit,
was
12
offered by way of compensation for the absence of procedural protections.'
D.

When All Else Fails, Rely on Discretion

Finally, the Supreme Court found support in a point that Justice Ginsberg
relied upon in a notorious 1996 case, Bennis v. Michigan' 3-deference to another
decisionmaker who is supposedly entitled to broad discretion. In Bennis, the
Court held that a Michigan forfeiture statute that permitted the forfeiture of a
jointly owned car because of the husband's conduct with a prostitute was not
constitutionally infirm because it failed to offer the wife and co-owner an innocent
owner defense. The Michigan statute set up forfeiture proceedings as an equitable
action and granted the presiding judge broad discretion to make whatever order
seemed appropriate. For Justice Ginsberg, that discretion was decisive, as her
concurrence provided the fifth vote necessary for a majority.114 In throwing in her
lot with the majority to uphold Michigan's forfeiture law, she wrote, "[Michigan's]
Supreme Court stands ready to police exorbitant applications of the statute."'1 5
The possibility that others might view the facts of this case as presenting just such
an "exorbitant" and unjust application of the statute apparently did not occur to
her.
So, too, in the Rucker case the Court felt that some deference ought to be
shown to the decisions of the PHA's because they may exercise their discretion to
prevent unfairness in particular cases. Thus, according to the Court, we should not
assume that they have not done so:
The statute does not require the eviction of any tenant who violated the lease
provision. Instead, it entrusts that decision to the local public housing authorities,
who are in the best position to take account of, among other things, .... "the extent
to which the leaseholder
has ... taken all reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the
1
offending action."" 6

Presumably this means that sometimes this discretion will be exercised to
allow innocent tenants to stay in their homes. But if the public housing authorities
need not take this into account, why would they? And if they do consider it

111. See Wiercioch, supra n. 104, at 1410 ("The use of leasehold forfeitures purportedly enabled law
enforcement to remove, more quickly than allowed under standard eviction procedures, public housing
tenants suspected of drug trafficking.") (emphasis added).
112. Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1132-33 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
113. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
114. Id. at 457 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
115. Id.
116. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. at 1235 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 28776, 28803 (May 24, 2001)).
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relevant to whether or not the innocent tenant gets evicted along with the guilty,
17
why should it not always be relevant?'
On the other hand, the issue of discretion highlights a central problem. That
is, how to effectively rid public housing projects of high profile crime when one is
unlikely, in many cases, to be able to get hard evidence. In this regard, it has been
suggested that measures such as these, with deference to the local PHA to make
the judgment call on who "deserves" eviction and who must go for the good of the
others, whether or not they "deserve it," are necessary. 18 Perhaps that is all that
this Supreme Court decision allows-throwing the ball back into the PHA's court.
However, as has been previously noted, the problem with this solution is that
there is no guarantee that everyone will agree with all of the substantive decisions,
or more to the point, that the courts will. Whether or not one thinks this is a bad
thing (there are some arguments that it is a good thing to diminish courts'
interference in such matters), 119 past experience with the exercise of unrestrained
discretion by the PHA resulted in racial discrimination, discrimination against
persons with unpopular views or lifestyles, the poorest of the poor, and so on. It
does not take much imagination to predict that unreviewed discretion will result in
the resurgence of such practices.
Based on the popularity of the "One Strike" program from a political
perspective, and the enhancements and incentives extended to those PHAs that
could show they vigorously enforced the policy, it seems unlikely that much
discretion will be exercised. Indeed, it is the lack of need to exercise discretion
that adds to the law's administrative ease of application. However, as indicated
the PHA's have not had a particularly good record regarding the exercise of their
discretion in the past. 20 Indeed, it was precisely on these grounds that the
complained of due process protections were put in place when it was shown that
the PHA were using that discretion to engage in discriminatory practices and to
evict persons of whom they disapproved. 2' Perhaps the Court thinks now they
would do a better job? Or perhaps it is just that now the Court is happier to think
it might be so and to thereby thrust the problems of the poor out of sight..

117. According to the Supreme Court, "no-fault" eviction is common. The Court cites nothing more
than HUD's own regulations asserting this as authority for this proposition. See id. (quoting 56 Fed.
Reg. 51560, 51567 (Oct. 11, 1991)). In fact, landlord tenant law is an area that has been extensively
regulated in most states to provide more protection to tenants from eviction without adequate notice
or grounds, not less. But whether or not this is an accurate statement of the law as it applies to the
arrangements between private landlord-tenants agreements, it is not at all clear that the government
ought to be treated the same way as a private landlord any more than the government can be viewed as
just another "employer" for purposes of Section 1983.
118. William Maher, Wisdom Revisited: Judicial Intervention and the Exercise of Discretion in "Strict
Liability" Public Housing Evictions, 8 J. Affordable Hous. & Community Dev. L. 218 (1999); Smyers,
supra n. 61.
119. See Maher, supra n. 118, at 225.
120. See Smyers, supra n. 61, at 577-87.
121. Id. at 579-84 (describing how PHA "desirability" and other policies were systematically used in
discriminatory ways or resulted in arbitrary denials or exclusions).
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"No Liability" Offers No Deterrence

Of course, expecting public housing authorities to prove each case to the
standard applicable to a court of law may render the power to evict essentially
null, or at the least, ineffective, as the legislative comments to the amendments to
Section 881 suggest. Without wide latitude to address these problems, so the
argument goes, public housing tenants themselves will be victims of the drug
dealers. It may be necessary to evict persons who, through no fault of their own,
attract or shelter the people who are engaging in the illegal behavior that makes
the projects virtually unlivable for others. "Strict liability 122 maximizes deterrence
and eases enforcement difficulties.' ' 123 While it is obvious how strict liability might
ease "enforcement difficulties," it seems equally obvious that it does so because of
the reduced need to evaluate circumstances, gather and weigh evidence, and to
make tough choices-in other words, to exercise discretion. It hardly seems an
argument in support of deferral to agency discretion to point to the ways in which
a bright-line rule obviates the need to use such discretion.
Conversely, as easy as it is to see why strict liability might ease an agency's
enforcement burden, it is unclear how it could "maximize deterrence" if strict
liability renders all efforts to avoid or deter an infraction equally unavailing. Why
bother to search your daughter's room or police your son's friends or warn your
guests about the "drug policy" in your house if it will not make any difference in
the outcome? Well, of course people might do any of these things because they
care about their children, are opposed to drug use, do not want to deal with the
problems associated with drug use, and so forth. One might even say this is selfevident. "People who care about their children will do this regardless," may be
the retort. Exactly. So then what role does strict liability (or rather vicarious
liability) play as a deterrent? If there are more pressing and urgent reasons that
people would take measures to keep family members away from drugs, then it
would seem that strict liability would play only a minor role-perhaps to those
who care more about losing their housing than losing their children. This is
especially true if the person who does everything to "maximize deterrence" has no
guarantee of being treated any differently than one who turns a blind eye. Where
is the incentive in strict liability to make any effort at all?
Of course it is unfair to say that the only ones affected would be those who
care about their housing more than their children. If you care about both, it may
be significant that there is a difference in the degree of control that you have over
the fate of each. No one can really control another person, especially not an
addict determined to use drugs. Governor Bush has not been able to control the
behavior of his daughter any more than the fictional drug czar played by Michael
Douglas in Steven Soderbergh's Traffic 124 was able to control the drug use of his
122. As previously noted, this policy is not really a "strict liability" policy. It is a no liability policy.
123. Rucker, 122 S.Ct. at 1235. (Of course the Court misspoke here. This is not really strict liability.
It is vicarious liability.). Cf. Nelson H. Mock, Student Author, Punishing the Innocent: No-Fault
Eviction of Public Housing Tenants for the Actions of Third Parties,76 Tex. L. Rev. 1495 (1998).
124. Traffic (USA 2000) (motion picture).
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daughter. But what you can do, at least with adult children, spouses, aunts,
cousins, grandmothers, and caretakers, is to put them out. Perhaps that is the only
true incentive offered by strict liability. The non-user, faced with a user who
cannot be controlled, may at least attempt to put the user out.
Of course, one is immediately struck by a dilemma. If the non-user tenant
cannot control the user, can the non-user tenant even get the user to leave? And
what about the parent who has adolescent children too young to leave home but
too old to control effectively? And what about the frail elderly person, like
Herman Walker, who needs help simply to survive and perform everyday
functions? What control do the Herman Walkers of the world exert over the
person who might be able to withhold their medication, their oxygen, or a trip to
the bathroom? Precious little, it would seem. For persons like Herman Walker,
strict liability simply casts them between the proverbial rock and a hard place-no
way to avoid the user, and no way to escape the consequences of the user's drug
use.

125
126

All of the respondents in the Rucker case appear to fit this profile. Pearlie
Rucker's daughter, the drug user, was severely mentally disabled and Rucker
herself was sixty-three years old at the time the lawsuit on her behalf was begun. 2 7
Herman Walker is disabled and dependent upon the caretaker who was the drug
user. Barbara Hill and Willie Lee are elderly women raising their grandsons who
were caught smoking marijuana in the parking lot. If there were facts beyond
those cited in the opinion that suggest, appearances to the contrary, that the
agency's discretion was properly exercised in this case, they were not adduced in
the documents filed beiow.1 8
F.

Uncivil Regulation

Finally, regarding the tenants' argument that their due process rights were
violated because there had been no finding of culpability, the Supreme Court
distinguished the precedents the tenants cited, asserting that these cases dealt
"with the acts of [the] government as sovereign.' ' 129 The Court said, "[tihe
situation in the present case is entirely different. The government is not
attempting to criminally punish or civilly regulate respondents as members of the
general populace. 1 30 It is not? Surely the intent of Congress was to "civilly
regulate" the general populace to the extent that drug use in public housing affects
more than just the residents there. It seems fair to say that this regulation is

125. For additional arguments that the one-strike policy is bad beyond the inequity of punishing
those not at fault, see Barclay Thomas Johnson, The Severest Justice Is Not the Best Policy: The OneStrike Policy in PublicHousing, 10 J. Affordable Pub. Hous. & Community Dev. L. 234 (2001).
126. It is not clear from the Rucker court opinions and briefs whether the grandsons of Willie Lee
and Barbara Hill are minors.
127. Br. of Respt. Jt. App. at 30a, Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230.
128. Reasonable people might disagree about Herman Walker's situation since his apartment
appeared to be in use as a crack house.
129. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. at 1236.
130. Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2002

17

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 38 [2002], Iss. 2, Art. 7
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:385

simply part of the overall attempt to "civilly regulate" drug use on several fronts at
once. The Court itself recognized this in distinguishing those efforts as they relate
to property owners versus mere tenants."' The challenged section at issue here
was part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which was not by any means limited
to public housing residents or promulgated with the government's role as landlord
foremost. 132 Rather, the Act reflects the government acting as sovereign to shape
the conditions of civil life. This is no regularly recognized part of the duty of a
private landlord.
V.

CONGRESS SPOKE, IS THE COURT LISTENING?

In concluding the opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist proclaimed that,
pursuant to Chevron, "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue ''133 and, therefore, the respondents could be evicted "regardless of whether
'
the tenant knew, or should have known, of the drug-related activity."134
Yes,
Congress has indeed spoken. But if one characterizes the "precise question at
issue" as whether or not penalties ought to be imposed on persons innocent of any
wrongdoing, it appears that the Court misheard. In reforming the civil forfeiture
laws that obviated the perceived "distinction" noted between forfeitures of
leaseholds and evictions, Congress had this to say about the propriety of visiting
punishment on the innocent: "[A] meaningful innocent owner defense is required
by fundamental fairness.",3 ' That was one of the purposes of the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act ("CAFRA"), to13 6make the innocent owner defense
"uniform" and applicable to all forfeitures.
On the other hand, one could say that the problem is a disagreement over
what fundamental fairness requires. Congress considered and passed CAFRA in
the wake of cases like Bennis in which the Supreme Court offered its view that an
innocent owner defense was not required by fundamental fairness, at least not
when it came to "equitable," in rem forfeitures.' 37 Whether or not one regards the
loss of tenancy rights in public housing as the equivalent of the loss of a home one
owns (and those that place a great weight on the concept of property will probably
disagree), it seems fairly clear here that what we have is a disagreement over what
constitutes "fundamental fairness." The Court's attempt to characterize its actions
as merely effectuating the will of Congress is thus disingenuous.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In short, none of the arguments offered by the Supreme Court to uphold
HUD's interpretation of this statute compel its result. Both textualism and resort

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 54.
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,42 U.S.C. §§ 11901-11925 (Supp. 2002).
Rucker, 122 S.Ct. at 1236 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
H.R. Rpt. 106-192, at 15 (June 18,1999) (emphasis added).
Id. CAFRA was enacted as the Civil Asset Reform Act of 2000.
Bennis, 516 U.S 442.
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to legislative history can, as demonstrated, support the opposite result.
Nevertheless, the Court has cleared the way for public housing authorities to evict
innocent persons from public housing. There is no question that public housing in
many areas has become the proverbial den of thieves and a hotbed of crime and
violence, much related to, but not exclusively so, the drug trade. Both the public
housing authorities and public housing tenants have an interest in remedying this
situation-perhaps no one more than the residents themselves. But the residents
138
have had little say, although many of them support the "One Strike" policy
because of the deplorable conditions existing in many projects. Whether they
would generally support evictions such as the ones in this case is unclear. People
are often eager to apply strictly to others a rule that seems unfair when applied to
themselves. But, however they feel, one thing is clear: they have little in the way
of options.
Judge Hawkins summed up the situation nicely in the Ninth's Circuit's
majority opinion:
Many of our nation's poor live in public housing projects that, by many accounts, are
little more than illegal drug markets and war zones. Innocent tenants live
barricaded behind doors, in fear for their safety and the safety of their children.
What these tenants may not realize is that, under existing policies of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development.. ., they should add another fear
to their list: becoming homeless if a household member or guest engages in criminal
drug activity on or off the tenant's property, even if the tenant did not know of or
have reason to know of
such activity or took all reasonable steps to prevent the
1 39
activity from occurring.
It is not as if the costs of drug use are not high enough already for a family in
which one member has a drug problem. Just ask Governor Bush or former
Senator McGovern. Drug use and abuse by a family member can and often does
become a family tragedy. For the poor who are dependent upon public housing,
there now may be no shelter from the storm.

138. At least as applied to those who are actually committing crimes such as drug dealing. See e.g.
Adam P. Hellegers, Student Author, Reforming HUD's "One Strike" Public Housing Evictions through
Tenant Participation,90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 323, 325 (1999).
139. Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1116.
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